INTERNAL

REVENUE-STANDING-SECTION 1346(a) (1) AUTHORIZES REFUND SUIT BY PARTY WHO PAID, UNDER PROTEST, TAXES
ASSESSED AGAINST ANOTHER TO REMOVE

FEDERAL TAX LIEN

FROM HER PROPERTY-United States v. Williams, 115 S.Ct. 1611
(1995).
The United States, as sovereign, cannot be sued except where
it consents.' Thus, a party desiring to institute an action against
I United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834). "Sovereign immunity"
is defined as "[a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its consent." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990). The
Supreme Court apparently acknowledged the sovereign immunity of the federal government for the first time in Cohens v. Virginia. James S. Sable, Comment, Sovereign
Immunity: A Battleground of Competing Considerations,12 Sw. U. L. REv. 457, 459 (1981)
(citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821)). ChiefJustice Marshall asserted in Cohens that "[t] he universally received opinion is, that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States." Cohens, 19 U.S. at 411-12. The
Supreme Court did not attempt to clarify the reasoning behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the justification for it until almost 60 years later in United States v.
Lee. Sable, supra, at 460 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-07 (1882)).
Justice Miller's opinion in Lee is described as "a pioneer effort to interpret the scope
of the immunity in the light of its purposes." Roger C. Cramton, NonstatutoyReview of
FederalAdministrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject
MatterJurisdiction,and PartiesDefendant, 68 MicH. L. REv. 387, 396 (1970). The Court
in Lee attempted to glean the rationale for the doctrine by comparing England's application of monarchial immunity with the United States system of government, but
found that it was "difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption
from liability to suit rests." Lee, 106 U.S. at 205, 206.
A more contemporary examination of the source and nature of sovereign immunity was conducted by the Court in Nevada v. Hall 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979). In
Hall, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine was founded primarily upon the
structure of the English feudal system, in which the King could not be sued because
the King's court was the highest court and, to a lesser extent, upon the myth that "the
King could do no wrong." Id. at 415. Although the ancient maxim that "the King
could do no wrong" was rejected early on in this country, the notion of sovereign
immunity as an attribute of government remained. Id. The Supreme Court explained in Kawananakoav. Polyblank that the persistence of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was due to the practical and logical premise that "there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). In United States v. Shaw, the
Court averred that the philosophical underpinnings behind the doctrine of sovereign
immunity are an integral part of our legal philosophy, partaking "somewhat of dignity
and decorum, somewhat of practical administration, [and] somewhat of the political
desirability of an impregnable legal citadel where government as distinct from its
functionaries may operate undisturbed by the demands of litigants." United States v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940). For more general discussions of the history of and
rationale for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Cramton, supra, at 396-400; Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court'sNew Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran
Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian WaterRights, 18 HARv. ENVrL. L.
REv. 433, 433-61 (1994); Louis L.Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-21 (1963); Sharon J. Kronish, Comment, Sovereign
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the United States must first bring the case within an act of Congressional authority for courts to be able to exercise jurisdiction.'
Where the government does consent to be sued, however, the
waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be "unequivocally expressed" in the language of the statute.3 Furthermore, when interpreting statutes that authorize suit against the
United States, courts must use caution so as not to enlarge the
waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the meaning of the statutory
language.' If any ambiguity exists as to Congress's intent to waive
the government's sovereign immunity, the ambiguity is construed
in favor of immunity.5
Historically, one could not maintain an action against the
United States for a refund of taxes that were alleged to have been
overpaid.6 Today, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1), the government consents to waive its sovereign immunity for refund actions
to recover taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. 7 Certain jurisdictional prerequisites exist, howImmunity: A Modern Rationale in Light of the 1976 Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, 1981 DuKE L.J. 116, 116-21 (1981); Sable, supra, at 457-63; Douglas Kahle,
Note, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.: "Unequivocal," Yet Unwarranted,Support For
Sovereign Immunity, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 325, 325-31 (1994).
2 Clarke, 33 U.S. at 444.
3 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992). This principle made its debut in The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 19 (1869). John C. Nagle,
Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. Rv.771, 778
n.30. In The Davis, the Court stated that the United States could not be made an
original defendant absent an act of Congress "expressly authorizing" a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Davis, 77 U.S. at 19.
4 See Eastern Transp. Co.v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927) (finding that
"[t]he sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption against its suability, unless it is clearly shown; nor should a court enlarge its liability to suit beyond what the
language requires"). The origin of this rule may be traced to Schillinger v. United
States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894). Nagle, supra note 3, at 778 n.31. In that case, the
Court announced that courts may not go "[b]eyond the letter of such consent.., no
matter how beneficial they may deem or in fact might be [in] their possession of a
larger jurisdiction over the liabilities of the Government." Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166.
5 United States v. Williams, 115 S.Ct. 1611, 1616 (1995) (citing Nordic, 503 U.S. at
33).
6 M. Carr Ferguson, JurisdictionalProblems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 IowA L.
REv. 312, 327 (1963). Instead, refund suits were brought directly against the tax collector based on the common-law theory of "assumpsit for money had and received."
Id. See also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1960) (detailing the progression of refund actions from common-law origins to the present form). Assumpsit for
money had and received "[ius of equitable character and lies, in general, whenever
[a] defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience he ought to
pay to [the] plaintiff." BLACK'S LAw DICriONARY 123 (6th ed. 1990).
7 15JAcoB MERTENS,JR., THE LAw oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 58A.03 (1992).
The jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), states in
pertinent part:
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ever, that must be met to bring a tax refund suit against the United
States. 8 Pursuant to the statutory scheme, the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing the action and
must also comply with the applicable statutes of limitation.9 In addition, the plaintiff must have paid the entire amount of the tax
assessed.10
In United States v. Williams, the Court considered whether
there was an additional prerequisite that the plaintiff had to be the
party against whom the taxes were assessed to bring a refund action
against the United States pursuant to § 1346(a) (1). 11 Prior to the
Court's decision in Williams, many courts held that the waiver of
sovereign immunity embodied in § 1346(a) (1) conferred standing
only upon the party against whom the taxes were assessed.1" Other
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: (1) Any civil action
against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or
any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws[.]
Id."
8 Ferguson, supra note 6, at 331.
9 Id. at 331, 336.
10 F/ora, 362 U.S. at 146. The F/0ra Court, resolving a conflict among the courts of
appeal as to whether a refund suit could be brought for the recovery of a partial
payment of a tax, held that payment of the entire amount assessed was a prerequisite
to a refund suit pursuant to § 1346(a)(1). Id. at 146, 147.
11 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615. Although this requirement was not expressly stated
in the jurisdictional statute, courts nevertheless adhered to the "abstract principle"
that a party who voluntarily pays taxes assessed against another may not recover a
refund. Ferguson, supra note 6, at 331 n.98.
12 See, e.g., Snodgrass v. United States, 834 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that wife lacked standing to bring refund suit for recovery of taxes assessed against her
husband when the government did not coerce payment of taxes that were paid out of
proceeds from the sale of community property); Busse v. United States, 542 F.2d 421,
421, 423 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding that wife could not bring refund action when she
paid taxes assessed against her husband in order to release her property from tax
liens); Eighth St. Baptist Church v. United States, 431 F.2d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir.
1970) (maintaining that employer church was not a taxpayer, but merely a collection
agent for taxes owed by its employees and, as such, the church could not maintain a
refund suit); Phillips v. United States, 346 F.2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that
§ 1346(a) (1) is unavailable when the plaintiff does not file suit as a taxpayer); First
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 297, 299, 300 (3d Cir. 1959) (holding that bank
could not maintain refund suit for money collected by the United States from sale of
equipment belonging to mortgagor/taxpayer to satisfy tax liens, even though bank's
mortgage was senior to some of the tax liens). The court in Hummel v. United States,
faced with the same jurisdictional question, found "an army of precedents" in support
of the principle that § 1346(a) (1) authorizes suit only by the taxpayer against whom
the taxes were assessed. Hummel v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (S.D. Iowa
1980). See also 5 JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GrT AND Es-
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courts permitted refund suits even when the
plaintiff was not the
13
one against whom the taxes were assessed.
The scope of jurisdiction granted by § 1346 (a) (1) is not determined by reading the statute in isolation; rather, the provision is
construed together with other relevant provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.14 The seemingly broad language of § 1346(a)(1)
must be read in conjunction with other conditional statutes that
qualify a party's right to bring a refund action. 5 Some courts have
held that reading the section in conjunction with other Code provisions narrows the waiver of sovereign immunity by permitting
16
standing only to those against whom the taxes were assessed.
§ 71.06[10], at 71-117 (1991) (noting "[a) person who makes an overpayment (of his own taxes) is entitled to the refund even if another's funds were
used") (citing Thompson v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1977)).
13 See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 895 F.2d 992, 992-94 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that wife was entitled to bring refund suit for payment of taxes assessed against former
spouse when her attorney used proceeds from sale of property received in divorce
settlement to remove tax liens from that property); Parsons v. Anglim, 143 F.2d 534,
535 (9th Cir. 1944) (finding that wife was permitted to maintain refund action for
payment of taxes assessed against deceased husband when the government mistakenly
asserted that she was liable as transferee of husband's property); Barris v. United
States, 851 F. Supp. 696, 698 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (declaring that party who paid taxes,
which were assessed against another, upon belief of personal liability had standing to
bring refund action); Brodey v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 44, 44 (D. Mass. 1991)
(ruling that officer and shareholder of corporation, who paid taxes assessed against
corporation under mistaken belief of personal liability, was a "taxpayer" for purpose
of bringing refund action); 15JACOB MERTENSJR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 58.06, 58.13 (1994) (explaining that whether a third party may recover taxes
depends on the voluntariness of payment).
14 Flora, 362 U.S. at 157-58. See infra note 75 (quoting the Court's rationale and
specifying the statutes deemed relevant by the Court).
15 United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601 (1990). In dealing with the time period for which refund claims must be filed, the Dalm Court reasoned that
§ 1346(a)(1) had to be read in conjunction with both 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which
requires that a refund claim first be filed with the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate, and 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which imposes time limitations upon filing a refund claim. Id. at 601-02; 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11)(B) (1988). See also infra note 110
(quoting statutes and explaining their significance in context). The majority determined that these provisions worked together to narrow the seemingly broad waiver of
sovereign immunity expressed in the spacious language of the jurisdictional statute.
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601-02. Similarly, the Williams Court examined the jurisdictional
reach of § 1346(a) (1) in the context of §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a). Williams, 115 S. Ct.
at 1616-18. In addition, the Court also considered the impact of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7701 (a) (14), which defines the term "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14) (1988)).
16 See, e.g., Hummel v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 1980)
(finding that when read in conjunction, § 1346(a) (1) and 26 U.S.C. § 7422 act as a
waiver of sovereign immunity, which must be narrowly construed); Jorrie v. Imperial
Inv. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (explaining that when considering
the waiver of sovereign immunity, §§ 1346(a)(1) and 7422 must be construed together and subject to congressional limitations and restrictions).
TATE TAXATION
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In addition to construing § 1346(a) (1) with relevant sections
of the Internal Revenue Code, the Williams Court considered the
unavailability of other remedies in determining whether Congress
intended to include parties in Williams's situation within the ambit
of the jurisdictional grant. 7 Finally, the majority addressed policy

considerations in ascertaining whether the jurisdiction conferred
by the statute extends or should extend to parties in Williams's
situation."'

In evaluating these factors, the Court resolved the split in authority among the circuit courts in Williams's favor. 19 The majority
held that a party, who was not assessed a tax but who paid that tax

under protest to remove a federal tax lien from her property had
standing, pursuant to § 1346(a) (1), to bring an action against the
United States for a refund of taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. 20 Additionally, the Court
found that the term "taxpayer," as used in statutes governing
claims for administrative refunds, did not limit the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(a) (1) to only the party assessed.2 ' Finally,
the Williams Court made no determination with regard to whether
a party who voluntarily2 2 pays the tax liabilities of another could
maintain a refund suit.
17 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618. Whether the party seeking the refund is left without
a remedy is not always dispositive of the issue in and of itself. As evidenced by the
Court's decision in Dalra, the claimant was foreclosed from seeking relief because she
failed to raise the theory of equitable recoupment within statutory time limits. Dalim,
494 U.S. at 610. In Dalm,although the Court recognized that the party seeking the
refund would not be able to pursue any other remedies, the majority nevertheless
refused to "overrid[e] Congress' [s] judgment as to when equity requires that there be
an exception to the limitations bar[ ]" imposed on the jurisdictional grant by 26
U.S.C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511 (a). Id. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged in Snodgrass that
construing the waiver of sovereign immunity granted by § 1346(a) (1) strictly, so as to
include only the person against whom the tax was assessed, could leave the plaintiff
without a remedy. Snodgrass v. United States, 834 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1987). The
court recognized, however, that although inequity might result from a finding that
the plaintiff lacked standing, such determination was an unfortunate but unavoidable
consequence of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. (quoting Phillips v. United
[T]he spirit proper to judicial consideraStates, 346 F.2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1965) ("'
tion of a waiver of sovereign immunity is not one of generosity and broad
interpretation.'").
18 Williams, 115 S.Ct. at 1619-20. Specifically, the Court considered: (1) whether
finding standing in Williams's situation would run afoul of the principle that parties
may not generally challenge the tax liabilities of others; and (2) whether permitting
Williams to sue would lead to rampant abuse of the statute. Id.
19 Id. at 1614, 1615.
20 Id. at 1614.
21 Id. at 1617.
22 Id. at 1620.
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The property at issue in Williams was initially purchased byjerrold Rabin and Lori Williams.2" Approximately twelve years later,
Rabin incurred employment tax liabilities through his ownership
interest in a restaurant and was assessed by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).24 Accordingly, the government placed a lien in the
assessed amount on all of Rabin's property, which included his in25
terest in the house that he owned with Williams.
During this time, Rabin and Williams had been contemplating
divorce and, as part of the division of their marital property, Rabin
had conveyed his interest in the house to Williams. 26 At the time of
the conveyance, Williams did not have notice of the federal tax lien
on the property.2 7 As consideration for Rabin's interest in the
house, Williams assumed three non-tax liabilities totaling nearly
8
$650,000.

2

After Rabin deeded his interest to Williams, the government
made further assessments in excess of $26,000 against Rabin; however, it did not file notice until June 22, 1989.29 On May 9, 1989,
Williams entered into a contract to sell the house and a closing
Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1614.
Id. at 1614-15. On or about June 1987 and March 1988, the Internal Revenue
Service made initial assessments against Rabin in the approximate aggregate amount
of $15,000. Id.
25 Id. The lien was placed on Rabin's property pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6321,
which states: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
Id. at 1615 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988)). Thus, although the house was owned
jointly by Rabin and Williams, it was still subject to the lien. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at
1614-15. The government did not take the position that Williams was personally liable for the taxes that were assessed against Rabin. Id. at 1615.
26 Id. The instrument of conveyance, a quitclaim deed, referred to Williams as "an
unmarried woman" even though she was still married to Rabin at the time of the
transfer. Id. at 1622 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The deed was recorded approximately three months prior to the commencement of divorce proceedings. Id. The
dissent pointed out that this misrepresentation raises the suspicion of whether Rabin
truly transferred the property to Williams "in contemplation of divorce" or whether
the conveyance was actually just an artifice used to shield Rabin's assets. Id. Prior to
the execution of the deed, Rabin entered into a transfer agreement with Williams,
whereby he agreed to indemnify her for payment of any liens upon the property. Id.
27 Id. at 1615. The government, although it had made the initial assessments as far
back asJune 1987 and March 1988, failed to file the tax lien until November 10, 1988.
Id. Therefore, Williams could not have had record notice of the liens as of the date of
conveyance. Id. In fact, the theory behind Williams's claim was that she took the
property free and clear pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a). Id. Section 6323 (a) provides
that "[t]he lien imposed by [26 U.S.C. §] 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser . . . until notice thereof . . . has been filed by the Secretary." 26 U.S.C.
§ 6323(a) (Supp. V 1993).
28 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
29 Id. The entire amount of assessments against Rabin totaled $41,937. Id.
23
24
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date was set for July 3, 1989.30 It was not until a week before the
closing that the government gave Williams and the purchaser actual notice that there were over $41,000 in tax liens on the property. 3 1 The government claimed that the liens were valid against
the property or the proceeds of the sale. 3 ' After learning of this
information, the purchaser threatened legal action against Williams if the sale did not proceed as scheduled.3 3 Williams authorized the disbursement in the assessed amount from the sale
proceeds to go directly to the IRS in order to convey clear title and
timely close the sale. 4
In an effort to recover the taxes she paid under protest, Williams initially applied for an administrative refund. 35 When her administrative claim was denied, Williams commenced an action in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California.6 Williams sought jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) (1). 3 7 The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that § 1346(a) (1) authorized
refund suits only by the party against whom the tax was assessed.3 8
Williams timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. 39 The court of appeals reversed, following
Fourth Circuit precedent, and found that Williams had standing to
bring a refund suit against the United States.40
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Williams v. United States, 24 F.3d 1143, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct.
1611 (1995). Williams claimed that as purchaser of the property, she had taken it free
of the government's tax lien pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a), which provides that
absent proper notice, a tax lien is not valid against a purchaser. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at
1615. In her complaint, Williams sought refund of the payment, interest, costs, and
attorney's fees. Williams, 24 F.3d at 1143-44.
37 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615. This jurisdictional statute waives the government's
sovereign immunity from suit by authorizing federal courts to hear "[a] ny civil action
against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have
been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); see also supra note 7 (quoting full text of provision).
38 Williams, 24 F.3d at 1144. In its decision, the district court relied on precedent

set in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615 & n.3 (citing

Snodgrass v. United States, 834 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1987); Busse v. United States,

542 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1976)).
39 Williams, 24 F.3d at 1144.
40 Id. at 1144, 1145. The appellate court relied upon the decision in Martin v.
United States, which held that a "plain reading" of § 1346(a) (1) simply authorizes refund suits by parties against whom the government erroneously or illegally assessed or
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4" to resolve the conflict among the circuit courts as to whether the jurisdictional grant of § 1346(a) (1) is limited only to the person against
whom the tax was assessed.42
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that § 1346(a) (1) grants jurisdiction to district
courts to hear refund suits for taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected by a party who was not assessed the taxes but who paid, under protest, to remove a federal
tax lien from his or her property. 43 In reaching this decision, the
Court found that other remedies were not meaningfully available." The majority posited that reading the statute in conjunction with the provisions regulating administrative claims for
collected a tax. Id. at 1144 (quoting Martin v. United States, 895 F.2d 992, 994 (4th
Cir. 1990)). In Martin, Mona Martin's ex-husband, Jerry Brodsky, deeded his interest
in property he jointly owned with Martin to Martin and her new husband. Martin, 895
F.2d at 992. Although Brodsky agreed to transfer his interest in 1979, he did not
actually deed the property to the Martins until 1983. Id. It was not until 1984 that the
deed was recorded. Id. Sometime after the deed had been executed but before it was
recorded, the IRS filed notice of a federal tax lien against the property for taxes owed
by Brodsky. Id. Subsequently, the Martins sold the property. Id. To convey clear title
to the property, the lawyer who conducted the closing paid approximately $18,800
out of the sale proceeds to the IRS. Id. at 992-93.
Upon learning that this payment had been made, the Martins filed for an administrative refund. Id. at 993. The IRS acknowledged that no lien was ever created
against the property because the notice of federal tax lien was filed after the deed to
the Martins had been executed. Id. The IRS nevertheless denied the refund, claiming that there was no procedure enabling the IRS to return a tax that was voluntarily
paid. Id.
The Martin court recognized a split in authority as to whether a third party had
standing to bring a refund suit. Id. Upon analyzing the law, the Martin court found
that those courts that denied standing did so by narrowly construing the waiver of
sovereign immunity. Id. The court declared that "[a] narrow construction allows
only those taxpayers who were actually assessed by the IRS to bring suit in federal
court to recover the amounts paid." Id. at 993.
In contrast, the court concluded that courts that did find standing were of two
categories: (1) those that broadly interpret the statute for equitable reasons so that
the plaintiff would not be left without a remedy; and (2) those that allowed claims by
third parties only so long as they involuntarily paid the taxes. Id. To find standing,
the court adopted neither approach, relying instead upon what it termed a "plain
reading" of the statute. Id. at 994. The court stated that "[a]lthough the statute is
silent as to who can bring the action, implicit in its language is that one against whom
the tax was erroneously assessed or collected has standing to do so." Id. Thus, according to the Martin court, the taxes were erroneously collected because they were collected from persons who did not owe them, and the plain reading of § 1346(a) (1)
allows such persons to bring a refund action against the United States. Id.
41 United States v. Williams, 115 S.Ct. 417 (1994).
42 United States v. Williams, 115 S.Ct. 1611, 1615 (1995).
43 Id. at 1614.
44 Id. at 1618
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refunds does not, by their use of the term "taxpayer," solely limit
the jurisdictional grant of § 1346(a) (1) to only those against whom
the taxes were assessed.4 5 Finally, the Court limited its holding,
explaining that its opinion did not address under what conditions,
if any, a party who voluntarily pays the taxes of another may seek a
refund.46
The circumstances under which one is considered a 'taxpayer'
for statutory purposes were previously addressed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Updike.4 7 In that case, the government
brought suit against the former stockholders of a dissolved corporation to collect a tax that it claimed was due from the corporation." It was undisputed that the government failed to file suit
within the time period prescribed by the statute governing tax collection proceedings.4 9 To keep its suit viable, the government contended that the statute of limitations, which was designed to
protect only taxpayers from suit, did not apply.5 0 The government
argued that the action was not actually being brought against the
taxpayer corporation but against the shareholder transferees who
were holding government funds in trust.5 The Court rejected the
government's argument and declared that it made no difference
whether the government sought to collect the tax assessment
against the corporation directly or from the shareholders.5 2 The
Court held that it did not exert any "undue strain" on the term
"taxpayer" so as to include within its meaning a person whose property, impressed with a trust, was subject to the burden of a tax." In
support of its conclusion, the Court explained that taxing acts,
Id. at 1616-17.
Id. at 1620.
47 281 U.S. 489 (1930).
48 Id. at 490-91. The Updike Grain Corporation (Updike) filed its annual return
at the end of its fiscal year in June 1917. Id. at 490. The corporation lawfully dissolved in August of that year. Id. In October 1917, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued a regulation that requiring corporations, like Updike, who had dissolved prior to a change in the tax laws, to file tax returns in accordance with the
changes. Id. One of these changes was an increased rate of taxation. Id.
49 Id. at 491-92. A revenue agent examined the corporation's books in October of
1918. Id. at 491. In January 1920, the government assessed additional taxes against
the corporation. Id. The government, however, did not bring suit to recover the
additional taxes until 1927-seven years after the assessment. Id. The applicable statutory provision provided that such suits had to be commenced within six years after
the assessment. Id. at 491-92.
50 Id. at 492-93
51 Id.
52 Updike, 281 U.S. at 494.
53 Id. The Court proclaimed that "[c]ertainly it would be hard to convince such a
person that he had not paid a tax." Id.
45
46
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along with their limiting provisions, should be construed liberally
in the taxpayer's favor."
With respect to refund suits in particular, the Court in Stahmann v. VidaP5 determined that a person who paid a tax assessed
against another had standing to maintain a refund action against
the government. 56 In Stahmann, a cotton grower attempted to
bring a refund suit against the tax collector for taxes that the
grower had paid, despite the fact that the taxes had been assessed
against the company that had ginned the grower's cotton." The
Court began its analysis by asserting the general rule that a third
party who voluntarily pays the taxes of another may not maintain a
refund action.5 8 The majority found, however, that the tax scheme
at issue assessed taxes against the ginner only as a matter of convenience, because the ginner could retain the cotton in his possession until the tax was paid by the grower. 59 The Court concluded
that standing to bring a refund action largely depended upon the
60
voluntariness of the payment.
The Supreme Court reached a similar decision in Colorado National Bank v. Bedford.61 In that case, the Court found a state tax
scheme requiring payment from banks consistent with federal law,
which forbade the imposition of taxes on banks, because the incidence of the tax actually fell upon the bank's customers.6 2 The
Court explained that the party who is liable for the tax is not always
the "real" taxpayer; rather, the taxpayer is the party "ultimately liable for the tax itself."6 ' Therefore, the Court held that a party not
assessed a tax, but upon which the incidence of the tax actually fell,
Id. at 496.
55 305 U.S. 61 (1938).
56 Id. at 66.
57 Id. at 62-63.
58 Id. at 64.
59 Id. at 65.
60 Stahmann, 305 U.S. at 66. According to accepted principles, the Court explained that the growers were proper parties to maintain a refund action, as long as
they did not volunteer to pay the taxes. Id. The Court further reasoned that the
growers were not volunteers because they paid the taxes under duress of goods. Id.
Duress of goods is an act consisting of "a tortious seizure or detention of property
from the person entitled to it, and requires some act as a condition for its surrender."
BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 504 (6th ed. 1990).
61 310 U.S. 41 (1940). The Court in Williams described the decision in Bedford as
relevant only insofar as it illustrated a preference for "common sense inquiries" over
form, a preference which belies the government's "technical argument" in its contention that the district court lacks jurisdiction over Williams. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at
1618.
62 Bedford, 310 U.S. at 52-53.
63 Id. at 52 (citing Stahmann v. Vidal, 305 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1938)).
54
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was a "taxpayer" for purposes of statutory interpretation.6 4
Although the Court in Flora v. United States 5 did not specifically define a "taxpayer," the case provides insight as to how the
Court interprets § 1346(a) (1).66 In Flora, the petitioner reported
for tax purposes certain losses that he incurred as ordinary losses.6 7
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, characterized
them as capital losses and, accordingly, levied a deficiency assessment.6" The petitioner paid a portion of the assessment and then
filed a refund claim.6 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari7 ° to
resolve a conflict among the circuit courts as to whether
§ 1346(a) (1) required full payment of the tax as a prerequisite to
bringing a refund action.7 1 Although § 1346(a) (1) authorized refund suits for any internal revenue tax, any penalty, or any sum, the
Court rejected petitioner's argument that the words "any sum"
could refer to partial payments of taxes. 72 Instead, the Court asserted that those words referred to amounts that were neither taxes
nor penalties.73
To glean the congressional intent in enacting the statute, the
Flora Court examined and discussed the history of § 1346(a) (1),
but found it inconclusive as to whether Congress meant to require
74
full payment of a tax prior to commencement of a refund suit.
The Court also recognized that the section must not be read alone,
rather; it must be construed with related statutes.7 5 Unwilling to
64 Id.

65 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
66 Id.
67 Id. at
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Flora
71 Flora,
72 Id. at

147.

v. United States, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
362 U.S. at 147, 148.
149.

73 Id. The Court explained that interest is an obvious example of a "sum" that is
neither a tax nor a penalty. Id.
74 Id. at 151-57. In discussing the history of the statute, the Court cited language
indicative of an inherent assumption that the proper plaintiff to a refund action was
the one against whom the tax was assessed. Id. For example, the Court quoted what it
referred to as "carefully considered dictum" in Cheatham v. United States, which stated
that payment of the tax claimed was "a condition precedent to a resort to the courts
by the party against whom the tax is assessed." Id. at 154, 155 (quoting Cheatham v.
United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1875)). In addition, the Court quoted language from
congressional debates that stated that as a precondition to suit, the plaintiff must "pay
his tax" and "his assessment." Id. at 159-60 (quoting 65 CONG. REc. 2621, 8110 (1924))
(emphases added).
75 Id. at 157. The Supreme Court articulated that "[w]e are not here concerned
with a single sentence in an isolated statute, but rather with ajurisdictional provision
which is a keystone in a carefully articulated and quite complicated structure of tax
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"sacrifice the harmony of our carefully structured twentieth century system of tax litigation," the Court held that § 1346(a) (1) required full payment of the tax as a prerequisite to bringing a
76
refund suit.
In United States v. Dalm, 77 the Supreme Court focused on the
importance of reading the broad language of § 1346(a) (1) in conjunction with other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.7 8 In
Dalm, the respondent characterized certain payments made to her
in 1976 and 1977 as gifts, but after auditing her returns, the IRS
determined that the payments should have been reported as income and, accordingly, assessed deficiencies against her.7 a In
1984, after settling with the IRS and agreeing to pay income tax
deficiencies, the respondent filed an administrative claim for the
refund of the gift tax that she paid on the 1976 transaction.80
When the government failed to take action upon her claim, she
commenced a refund suit in the district court.8 1 The government
moved to dismiss the action because the suit was filed after the
statute of limitations set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (a) had run.8 2
The respondent countered that she was entitled to maintain the
83
action pursuant to the doctrine of equitable recoupment.
laws." Id. In support of its conclusion, the Court examined the statute that established the Board of Tax Appeals, the Declaratory Judgment Act and 26 U.S.C.
§ 7422(e). Id. at 158-67.
76 flora, 362 U.S. at 176-77.
77 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
78 Id. at 601. The Court proffered that "[diespite its spacious terms, § 1346(a) (1)
must be read in conformity with other statutory provisions which qualify a taxpayer's
right to bring a refund suit upon compliance with certain conditions." Id. First, the
majority explained that § 1346(a) (1) had to be read in conjunction with § 7422 (a),
which requires the filing of an administrative claim as a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 60102. Second, the Court stated that the statute must also be read in conjunction with 26
U.S.C. § 6511 (a), which provides the limitations period for the filing of an administrative claim. Id. at 602.
79 Id. at 599.
80 Id. at 599-600. The respondent did not file a gift tax return for the 1977 payment. Id. at 599.
81 Id. at 600.
82 DaImr, 494 U.S. at 600. Section 6511 (a) requires that an administrative claim for
a refund must be filed "within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years
from the time the tax was paid," whichever period expires later. 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (a)
(1988).
83 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 600. The doctrine of equitable recoupment is defined as a:
[r]ule of the law which diminishes the right of a party invoking legal
process to recover a debt, to the extent that he holds money or property
of his debtor, to which he has no moral right.... [The doctrine) provides that, at least in some cases, a claim for a refund of taxes barred by
a statute of limitations may nevertheless be recouped against a tax claim
of the government.
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The Court opined that the statute under which the respondent sought jurisdiction, § 1346(a) (1), had to be construed in the
context of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a). 8 4 When read together, the Court explained, it was clear that unless a claim for a
tax refund is filed within the time limitation imposed by 26 U.S.C.
§ 6511 (a), a refund suit may not be maintained, regardless of any
illegal, erroneous, or wrongful collection. 5
The majority invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
reinforce the argument for strict construction of the jurisdictional
statute and to reject the respondent's claim for equitable recoupment.86 The Court reasoned that allowing the respondent to maintain her refund suit when she failed to adhere to statutory
requirements would venture "beyond the authority Congress has
given [the Court] in permitting suits against the Government" and
impermissibly undermine the principle of sovereign immunity.8 7
In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,"8 the Supreme
Court construed waivers of sovereign immunity in the context of
statutes other than § 1346(a) (1).89 The Court reiterated the common rule that waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed and should be narrowly construed.9 0 Although the
Court remarked that even if the statutory language appeared broad
enough to authorize the imposition of civil penalties upon the
BLAIC'S LAw DICTIONARY 539 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
The Court rejected the respondent's claim for equitable recoupment because
she did not assert the rule in the prior action. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 606. Accordingly, the
Court held that she was foreclosed from relitigating her liability with respect to the
gift tax. Id.
84 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601.
85 Id. at 602.
86 Id. at 608.
87 Id. at 609-10 (footnote omitted). The Court maintained that this was especially
true because Congress had already provided for several exceptions to the statute of
limitations prescribed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511 and 7422. Id. at 610. These exceptions,
codified as §§ 1311-1314, allow a taxpayer who was obligated to pay inconsistent taxes
to pursue a refund even though a refund action would otherwise be barred by
§§ 6511 (a) and 7422(a). Id. The majority reasoned that permitting the respondent's
judgment as
suit to proceed "would be doing little more than overriding Congress' [s]
to when equity requires there be an exception to the limitations bar." Id.
88 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
89 See id. at 615. Specifically, the Court examined whether Congress waived sovereign immunity with respect to state-imposed civil fines for past violations of the Clean
Water Act or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. Id. at 611.
90 Id. at 615. The Court recognized the tension that existed between a provision
suggesting a broad yet uncertain waiver of sovereign immunity for civil penalties and
the provision's antecedent text that demonstrated a narrower and clearer waiver for
coercive fines. Id. at 627. The Court concluded that such tension was properly resolved in favor of the sovereign. Id.
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United States, the Court held that absent a clear congressional intent, the statutes did not waive the government's sovereign immunity.9 Thus, the Court ruled that the statutes did not function to
waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.92
The Supreme Court examined the concept of sovereign immunity in depth in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.93 In that case,
a trustee in bankruptcy brought suit against the United States to
recover money that an officer of the bankrupt corporation had
withdrawn from the corporation's bank account to pay personal
tax liabilities.9 4 In reversing judgment for the trustee, the Court
held that the applicable section of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 106, did not give rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity. 95 In so
holding, the Court relied upon the rule that waivers of sovereign
immunity must be "unequivocally expressed" and generally should
not be liberally construed.9 6 The majority admitted that it had occasionally narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of the government's sovereign immunity when it was consistent with the clear
intent of Congress. 97 The Court proffered, however, that those instances did not serve to abolish the traditional rule that sovereign
immunity should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.9"
The Supreme Court reiterated that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be enlarged beyond the requirements of the statutory
91 Id. at 626 & n.16. In fact, the Court commented that even if there was an equal
probability that Congress did or did not intend to waive the government's sovereign
immunity, the rule that requires waivers of sovereign immunity to be narrowly construed would favor the narrow reading. Id. n.16.
92 Id. at 615.
93 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
94 Id. at 31.
95 Id. at 39. Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code provided:

(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity
with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which such governmental unit's claim arose. (b) There
shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a governmental
unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the
estate. (c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity-(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or "governmental
unit" applies to governmental units; and (2) a determination by the
court of an issue arising under such a provision binds governmental
units.
11 U.S.C. § 106,(1988).
96 Nordic, 503 U.S. at 33-34.
97 Id. at 34.
98 Id.
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language. 99 Because the Court found that the statute under scrutiny lent itself to at least two readings that would not authorize the
relief sought by the trustee, the majority concluded that there was
not an unequivocal and unambiguous intent of Congress to waive
sovereign immunity.1" 0 Furthermore, the Nordic Court pronounced that it would not consider the legislative history of the
statute to ascertain congressional intent with respect to resolving
the ambiguity, insisting that the government's consent to be sued
must be clearly expressed in the language of the statute itself.10 1
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the majority's
decision demonstrated the Court's preference for a strict interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity over the equitable in2
10

terests at issue.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Williams, acknowledged the rule that the Court may not enlarge waivers of sovereign
immunity beyond the scope of the language of the statute. 0 3 In
addition, Justice Ginsburg commented that the task of the Court
rested on discerning Congress's "unequivocally expressed" intent,
resolving any ambiguities in favor of sovereign immunity. 10 4 In determining whether § 1346(a) (1) waived the government's sovereign immunity from suit with respect to Williams, the Court began
99 Id.

Id. at 37. The first interpretation of § 106 would permit the bankruptcy court to
issue only declaratory and injunctive relief, but not monetary damages against the
government. Id. at 35. The second plausible reading of the statute would preclude
the trustee from seeking monetary relief because "the rules established in subsections
(a) and (b) for waiver of Government 'claim [s]' that are 'property of the estate' are
exclusive, and preclude any resort to subsection (c)." Id. at 37.
The Court explained that although these two statutory interpretations were certainly not the only possible readings, their existence was enough to defeat any notion
that the statute unambiguously expressed a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id.
101 Nordic, 503 U.S. at 35. Congress responded to the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 106 by amending the statute in 1994. Joseph A. Guzinski, The New § 106:
Jurisdictionaland ConstitutionalIssues Persistfor Sovereign Immunity, 10 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 10, 10 (Sept. 14, 1995). The new enactment "completely abrogates sovereign immunity" by explicidy waiving it with respect to specifically enumerated causes of action.
Guzinski, supra, at 27.
102 Nordic, 503 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that a
literal reading of the statute's text permitted a waiver of sovereign immunity and that
this literal reading was supported by the statute's legislative history. Id. at 40, 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent denounced "the Court's love affair with the doctrine
of sovereign immunity," and commented that "[d]espite its ancient lineage, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is nothing but a judge-made rule that is sometimes favored and sometimes disfavored." Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
103 United States v. Williams, 115 S. Ct. 1611, 1615-16 (1995) (citing United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 614-16 (1992)).
104 Id. at 1616 (citing Nordic, 503 U.S. at 33).
100

1996]

NOTE

1347

its analysis by examining the language of the statute itself.10 5 The
Court found that Williams's refund suit for erroneously collected
taxes fell precisely within the statute's broad phraseology. 106 The
Court strengthened its position by pointing out that the spacious
language of the jurisdictional provision reflected the similarly
10 7
broad common-law remedy that was displaced by the statute.
Next, the majority asserted that the other statutes cited by the
government did not narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity only
to those against whom the tax was assessed. 10 8 Justice Ginsburg rejected the theory that Congress's use of the term "taxpayer," instead of a broader characterization, such as the "person who paid
the tax," would permit only the party who was assessed the tax to
seek administrative relief and, thereafter, bring a refund action in
the district courts. 0 9 The Court repudiated the government's argument that Williams could not bring a refund suit because she
was not a "taxpayer" entitled to exhaust administrative remedies
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(a), 6511(a) and 7701(a)(14).1 1 0
105 Id.; see supra note 7 (quoting text of statute).

Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616.
Id. (citing Ferguson, supra note 6, at 327). The common-law action of assumpsit
for money had and received was brought directly against the tax collector instead of
the United States. Id. (citing Ferguson, supra note 6, at 327). Assumpsit was a remedy afforded to people in Williams's situation, who paid money that they did not owe,
usually as a result of duress, fraud, or mistake. Id. (citing BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAw PLEADING 163-64 (3d ed. 1923)). The Court asserted that at
common law, Williams would not have been barred by the exclusion of voluntary
taxpayers from pursuing an action in assumpsit because she paid the tax under protest and was, therefore, not a volunteer. Id.
108 Id. at 1616-17.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1616. First, the government reasoned that § 7422(a) required administrative relief as a prerequisite to bringing a refund action. Id. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)
provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Secretary ....
26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1988).
The logic that supports reading this statute in conjunction with the jurisdictional
grant is that because an administrative claim must be filed as a prerequisite to suit, it
is relevant to first ascertain who is a proper party to file an administrative claim before
establishing who may bring a refund suit. See 15 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF
Although Williams complied with
FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION § 58.01 (1994).
§ 7422(a) by filing an administrative claim, the government contended that Williams
was not even qualified to file for an administrative remedy pursuant to § 6511(a).
Williams, 115 S.Ct. at 1616.
Section 6511(a) states in relevant part:
106
107
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The majority further stated that even if construing the statutes together did lead to the conclusion that only a "taxpayer" had standing to bring a refund suit, Williams would still not be excluded
from the statutory definition of a taxpayer."1 The Court then distinguished precedent supporting the government's reading of the
12
term "taxpayer."'
Next, the Supreme Court found that there was no other remedy available to Williams. 11 3 The majority asserted that the lack of
an alternative remedy strengthened the conclusion that Congress
did not intend to limit the jurisdictional grant of § 1346(a) (1)
solely to those against whom a tax was assessed. 1I 4 The Court maintained that none of the three remedies suggested by the govern[A] [c]laim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed
by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a
return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the
return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of
such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer,
within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.
26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (1988).
The Court explained that the government's reliance on the use of the word "taxpayer" in § 6511(a) was misplaced because the statute merely provides a limitation on
when one may file for administrative relief, and not on who may file a claim. Williams,
115 S. Ct. at 1617. In addition, the Court reasoned that reading the term "taxpayer"
in § 6511(a) as inherently limiting administrative relief only to the party assessed
would be inconsistent with other sections of the refund scheme, which explicitly provide for refunds to parties other than the one assessed. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a)
(1988) (authorizing the award of credits or refunds to "the person who made the
overpayment"); §§ 6416(a) and 6419(a) (1988) (describing the recipient of refunds
of other taxes as "the person who paid the tax")).
Finally, 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14) defines the term "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14) (1988). The government
argued that Williams did not fit within this statutory definition; therefore, she was
ineligible to apply for an administrative refund. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616-17.
111 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1617. The Court explained that the statutory definition is
broader than the interpretation offered by the government. Id. Although Williams
was not the party assessed, she became "subject to" an internal revenue tax and fell
within the statutory definition of a taxpayer when the government placed the tax lien
upon her home and accepted her payment under protest. Id.
112 Id. at 1617-18 (referring to Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 52
(1940)). The majority explained that the government, in attempting to demonstrate
that Rabin, not Williams, was the proper party to bring a refund suit, improperly
relied upon the Court's statement in Bedford that "'[t]he taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself.'" Id. at 1617 (quoting Bedford, 310 U.S. at 52). Justice
Ginsburg asserted that the only relevance that should attach to the holding in Bedford
was the Court's "preference for common sense inquiries over formalism," which disfavored the "technical" argument promulgated by the government in Williams. Id. at
1618.
113

Id.

114

Id.
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ment was realistically available to Williams.' 1 5 Justice Ginsburg
wrote that the first remedy, 26 U.S.C. § 7426, was unavailable 1 to
16
Williams because the government did not levy on her property.
Second, the majority concluded that a quiet title action under 28
U.S.C. § 2410 would not have afforded Williams "meaningful" relief.II 7 The Court found the third remedy, a release of the lien or
discharge of property in exchange for a new lien upon the proceeds of the sale, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6325(b) (3), equally unsatisfactory.1 1 8 Finally, the Court dismissed the government's
Id.
Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618. Section 7426, entitled "[c]ivil actions by persons
other than taxpayers," provides in pertinent part:
If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold pursuant
to a levy, any person (other than the person against whom is assessed
the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest in or lien on
such property and that such property was wrongfully levied upon may
bring a civil action against the United States in a district court of the
United States.
26 U.S.C. § 7426 (1988).
Based upon the legislative history of § 7426, the court in Snodgrass concluded
that when Congress enacted this statute in 1966, Congress intended § 7426, instead of
a generous interpretation of § 1346(a) (1), to become the sole remedy for a party
whose property had been wrongfully levied upon by the government. Snodgrass v.
United States, 834 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1987). The passage of § 7426 thus "removed the equitable need to find jurisdiction" under § 1346(a) (1). Hummel v.
United States, 494 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (S.D. Iowa 1980). Along the lines of this reasoning, the court in Busse concluded that cases prior to the enactment of § 7426 that
had been decided in the taxpayer's favor could be distinguished in light of the fact
that prior to the enactment of § 7426, except for a broad interpretation of
§ 1346(a)(1), no other remedy existed for parties whose property had been wrongfully levied upon. Busse v. United States, 542 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing S.
REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N 3722,
3750). The Court in Williams nevertheless found that this remedy was inapplicable
because Williams's property had not been levied upon. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618.
117 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618. This section provides in pertinent part that "the
United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court...
to quiet tide to ... real or personal property on which the United States has or claims
a mortgage or other lien." 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1) (1988). The Williams Court explained that Williams would not be afforded "meaningful" relief under this statute
because she did not receive actual notice of the liens until she was on the verge of
selling the house. Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618. Furthermore, the Court stated that a
protracted quiet title proceeding would have made it impossible for Williams to close
on time. Id. Thus, according to the majority, a refund action was preferable to a
quiet title action because the refund suit allowed Williams to dispose of the property,
while still being able to litigate the refund. Id.
118 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618. This section states in relevant part:
Subject to such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, the Secretary
may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to
the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a
fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same
115

116
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argument that allowing third parties to sue for a refund under
§ 1346(a) (1) would render the three remedies superfluous. 1 9
The last issue the Court addressed was the government's contention that permitting Williams to bring this action would violate
the rule that parties generally "may not challenge the tax liabilities
of others," thereby leading to abuse of the system. 12 ° Justice Ginsburg determined that by permitting Williams to sue, no significant
damage would be wrought against this principle.1 2 ' Furthermore,
the Court found unwarranted the government's fear that finding
standing in this instance would lead to abuse. 12 2 Finally, the
Supreme Court limited its holding to situations where the thirdmanner and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with
respect to the discharged property.
26 U.S.C. § 6325(b)(3) (1988).
Under this type of arrangement, Williams could have sold her property and conveyed clear title if she agreed to set aside part of the proceeds. Wil/iams, 115 S. Ct. at
1618. Although the value of Williams's property would have made her a candidate for
this remedy as it "far exceeded the value of the Government's liens," the Court nevertheless dismissed a remedy premised upon § 6325(b) (3) as "doubtful" because it was
only available at the discretion of the government. Id. The majority took the position
that the government could not fault Williams for failure to exhaust her administrative
remedies by not taking advantage of this seemingly appropriate solution because the
remedy "lies entirely within the government's discretion." Id. at 1618, 1619 & n.9.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the Secretary probably would not have offered
this remedy to Williams because the government has a greater incentive to immediately receive cash from someone desperate to remove a lien on their property than to
receive merely another lien over which the government would still have to litigate. Id.
at 1618-19.
119 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1619. The Court explained that while § 1346(a)(1) was
only available after full payment has been rendered to the government, the other
remedies offered relief before full payment has been made. Id. (citing Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960)).
120 Id. The government forecasted that violation of this principle would lead to a
situation where people would voluntarily pay third-party tax liabilities and then bring
a refund action after the government had ceased its collection efforts against the assessed party. Id.
121 See id. The majority noted several exceptions to the general rule to demonstrate
that this principle was not inflexible. Id. For example, the Court pointed out that a
fiduciary may litigate the liability of the taxpayer pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 301.69031(a). Id. The Court also noted that certain transferees are similarly permitted to
litigate the tax liabilities of transferors under 26 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1) (A) (1988). Id.
In addition, the Court articulated that in Stahmann v. Vtda a third party was permitted to bring a refund action under a different statute. Id. (citing Stahmann v. Vidal,
305 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1938)). Justice Ginsburg then asserted that any burden placed
upon the rule by allowing Williams to sue was diminished because she was not challenging the underlying validity of the tax, but rather, she was disputing the wrongful
attachment of the lien on her property. Id. at 1619-20.
122 Id. at 1620. The Court was unpersuaded by the government's prediction that
people would start paying taxes of third parties in order to assist others in tax evasion,
especially in the absence of any proof of that type of abuse occurring in circuits that
permitted standing. Id.
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party payment was involuntary, leaving undecided the circumstances under which a party who voluntarily paid another's taxes
would be able to bring a refund action under § 1346(a) (1).113
In a brief concurrence, Justice Scalia opined that the major-

ity's assertion that Williams was a "taxpayer" within the meaning of
26 U.S.C. §§ 6511 and 7701 (a) (14) was unnecessary and inapplicable to the Court's decision.124 Instead,Justice Scalia explained that
the clear waiver of sovereign immunity found in § 1346(a) (1)
would be given an implausible meaning if the explicit language of

the jurisdictional statute was narrowed by an implicit
reference to
12 5
the statutes governing administrative remedies.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Kennedy and
Thomasjoined, began the dissenting opinion by characterizing the
majority's holding as "an unusual departure from the bedrock
principle that waivers of sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally expressed.'" 12 6 The dissent expounded that in bypassing es-

tablished principle, the Court gave improper weight to the equities
of Williams's situation.

27

The Chief Justice concluded that read-

ing § 1346(a) (1) in conformity with the statutes pertaining to administrative remedies limited the waiver of sovereign immunity
only to "taxpayers."1 28 The dissent averred that because Williams
123 Id. The majority characterized Williams as an involuntary taxpayer because she
paid the taxes under protest for the sole reason of obtaining the release of a lien
erroneously maintained against her property. Id. The Court reasoned that because
the holding was limited to involuntary payments, its decision would not authorize the
multitude of third-party challenges feared by the government. Id.
124 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1620 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia commented
that those statutes dealing with administrative exhaustion were too remote to have
any impact on § 1346(a)(1). Id.
125 Id. The principle upon which Justice Scalia relied was that sovereign immunity
presents hardship in and of itself, and the courts should not "'add to its rigor by
refinement of construction where consent has been announced.'" Id. (citing United
States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949) (quoting Anderson v.
Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.))).
126 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
127 Id. The Chief Justice opined that when dealing with the Internal Revenue
Code, the equities of the situation was generally not a significant factor. Id. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the Court's perception of the equities was distorted in
light of the fact that Rabin's deed to Williams incorrectly named her as an "unmarried
woman" even though the conveyance took place some three months prior to the commencement of any divorce proceedings. Id. at 1622 (Rehnquist, CJ. dissenting).
This misrepresentation, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, might indicate that Williams was not the innocent victim the Court depicted, but she may have been helping
to shield Rabin's assets from the government. Id.
128 Id. at 1620-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that
the jurisdictional provision had to be read in conjunction with 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511(a)
and 7422(a) because both "qualify a taxpayer's right to bring a refund suit." Id. at
1621 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-
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was not subject to a tax, rather to a tax lien, she was not a taxpayer
under the definition set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14) and,
129
therefore, not authorized to bring a refund action.
Next, the Chief Justice argued that there were at least two
other remedies available to Williams that the Court improperly rejected.13 ° The dissent explained that the first remedy, a quiet title
action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1), obviously would not have
been convenient for Williams, but was nonetheless a viable remedy.' 3 1 The second remedy, the ChiefJustice asserted, a certificate
of discharge pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6325(b) (3), should not have
been dismissed by the Court merely because issuance of the certifi132
cate lied within the discretion of the Secretary.
02 (1990)). Therefore, the dissent explained, § 6511 does not serve merely as a deadline for the filing of administrative claims, but serves to expressly limit the filing of
such claims only to "taxpayers." Id.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the ChiefJustice did not agree that the existence of other provisions in the Code authorizing payment of refunds to third parties
rendered inconsistent a reading of § 1346(a) (1) that limited refund actions only to
the assessed party. Id. At best, the Chief Justice continued, the use of different language in the statutes cited by the majority could be considered an inconsistency or an
ambiguity, and because waivers of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed," any ambiguities must be construed in favor of immunity. Id. (citing United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992)).
129 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1622 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice accused the majority of "remarkably imprecise reasoning" in concluding that the government's placement of a lien on Williams's home and acceptance of her payment
under protest somehow transformed Williams into a "person subject to any internal
revenue tax," pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14). Id. In illuminating this difference, the dissent stated: "One may have a tax assessed against him, and if he pays it in
a timely manner he will never be subject to a lien. Conversely, one against whom the
tax was not assessed may nonetheless be subject to a lien to enforce collection of that
tax." Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1622-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent articulated its dissatisfaction with the majority's dismissal of the quiet tide remedy, stating that it is a "fact of
life" that sometimes people who want to sell their property discover that the property
is subject to a federal tax lien. Id. at 1623 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Furthermore,
the Chief Justice expounded, holders of property liens, especially the United States
government, have not been required to "afford the legal equivalent of 'same day service' to finally adjudicate title before the closing date." Id.
132 Id. Under this remedy, Williams could have sought a "certificate of discharge"
from the Secretary, which would have discharged the property from the lien, allowing
her to convey clear tide, and place a new lien on the proceeds of the sale "'as a fund
subject to the liens and claims of the United States.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Williams could have subsequently litigated the proprity of the lien pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 7426(a) (3). Id. The dissent challenged the majority's dismissal of this remedy as
"doubtful" for the sole reason that its issuance was within the discretion of a government official. Id. Rather, the dissent explained, placing this remedy in the discretion
of the Secretary was appropriate. Id. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed
out that some properties subjected to tax liens, such as property worth less than the
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Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by declaring that the majority's charitable interpretation of the provision would have been
more understandable if the statute under scrutiny had been one
conferring new benefits or rights on a class of people.13 3 The
Court's generous interpretation, the Chief Justice proffered, was
wholly inappropriate in construing a provision of the Internal Rev13 4
enue Code.
The decision in Williams, although providing an equitable result, breaks with the established principles that waivers of sovereign
immunity should be strictly construed by the Court and must be
"unequivocally expressed" in the statutory provision.13 5 Thus, even
though Williams did not owe taxes, and it would seem unfair to
deny her any recovery, the fact remains that she opted to pursue a
course of action and a remedy that, by strict statutory construction,
might not have been open to her. 136 The Court's broad holding,
that one does not have to be the party assessed to pursue a refund
action under § 1346(a) (1), sharply conflicts not only with strict
statutory construction but also with established lower court
value of the lien, might not be appropriate for this remedy. Id. Thus, it was entirely
appropriate for Congress to allow the Secretary to determine case by case whether the
proceeds from a particular sale would be adequate enough to permit this remedy. Id.
In Williams's case, the dissent proffered, Williams probably would have been a likely
candidate for this remedy had she pursued it, since the value of her property was far
greater than the amount of the tax liens. Id. Williams did not pursue this remedy,
however, and the dissent averred that it is an established rule that one cannot claim
an administrative remedy to be inadequate when one does not even invoke the remedy. Id.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's assertion that the government was at
fault for not proactively offering this remedy to Williams. Id. The Chief Justice
mused whether this reasoning would confer a duty upon IRS agents to issue warnings
to the people they investigate in a manner analogous to the requirement of Miranda
warnings, which must be administered to persons taken into custodial interrogation.
See id. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that because Williams even conceded
that the government had no obligation to inform her about the availability of discretionary relief, the majority's reasoning on this point was flawed. Id.
133 Id. at 1623-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Such statutes, explained the dissent,
are subject to more liberal constructions in order to accomplish their beneficent purposes. Id. at 1623 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
134 Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1624 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). When dealing with the
Internal Revenue Code, "it would surely come as news to the millions of taxpayers in
this country that the [Code] has a 'beneficent purpose' as far as [the millions of
taxpayers in this country] are concerned. It does not [have a beneficent purpose],
and the Court is mistaken to decide this case in a way that can only be justified if it
does." Id.
135 Williams, 115 S.Ct. at 1620 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). In fact, with respect to
waivers of sovereign immunity, the majority's decision in Williams "calls into question
the clear statement rule the Court had developed in its preceding five terms." Nagle,
supra note 3, at 796.
136 See United States v. Williams, 115 S.Ct. 1611 (1995).
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precedent.1

The Supreme Court's generous interpretation of § 1346(a) (1)
may already have opened the floodgates to sue under that statute.
For example, in WWSM Investors v. United States,138 the Ninth Circuit permitted WWSM, the creditor of a delinquent taxpayer, to
bring a refund suit under § 1346(a) (1) after WWSM failed to file
its wrongful levy action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7426 within the
relevant statute of limitations.3 9 Relying upon the Court's sentiment in Williams that substance is preferable over form, the court
in WWSM disregarded 26 U.S.C. § 7426 as the sole remedy for a
wrongful levy and permitted an otherwise time-barred claim
against the sovereign to proceed pursuant to the Supreme Court's
new reading of § 1346(a) (1). "
To achieve an equitable result without opening up the remedy
of a refund action to a whole new class of plaintiffs, the standing
issue in Williams could have been resolved by ascertaining the voluntariness of the payment.'
In fact, the Court appeared to be on
137 Id.; see supra note 12 (citing cases that held claimant had to be the assessed party
to bring an action under § 1346(a) (1)).
138 64 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 1995).
139 Id. at 457, 458. In WWSM, the IRS levied on bank accounts that belonged to
WWSM, seizing approximately $79,000. Id. at 457. This action gave rise to WWSM's
wrongful levy claim because the money was not owed by WWSM, but by another company, Advanced Plastics Engineering Corporation (Advanced). Id. WWSM had simply seized Advanced's assets pursuant to a security agreement that took priority over
the government's tax claim. Id.
140 Id. at 459 (citing Williams, 115 S. Ct. at 1618). Interestingly, Judge Brunetti filed
a dissenting opinion and proffered that the majority had misread and misapplied the
Supreme Court's decision in Williams. Id. (Brunetti, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the Supreme Court characterized Williams as a refund action, not a
wrongful levy case. Id. Furthermore, the dissent elucidated that the Court in Williams
did not "overrule or even hint that § 7426 was not the exclusive remedy for a claimed
wrongful levy." Id.
141 Many courts have used voluntariness of payment as a standard in determining
whether a third party could sue for a refund. See, e.g., Schoenherr v. United States,
566 F. Supp. 1365, 1367 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (setting forth a tripartite test to determine
whether a party had attained "taxpayer status" by virtue of involuntary payment of
another's taxes); Collins v. United States, 532 F.2d 1344, 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (utilizing
a volunteer standard and stating that "[i]n cases involving the payment of tax liabilities by a third party, it is fundamental that the plaintiff cannot recover if the payment
in issue was voluntary and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving some element
which would remove him from the category of volunteer"). See also Parsons v. Anglim,
143 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1944) (explaining that the word "volunteer" in the context
of tax law is a term of art meaning "one who cannot recover moneys paid as a donation to discharge another's tax," the determining factor being the volition to donate,
not the absence of coercion); McMahon v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 490, 494
(D.R.I. 1959) (holding that the term "taxpayer" should include any person who paid a
tax, provided that the payment was not voluntarily made); 15JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 58A.02 (1992) (stating that "[a] person who
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the verge of acknowledging this principle, whereby a party becomes a "taxpayer" for the purpose of bringing a refund action
if
1 42
compulsion.
under
or
involuntarily
made
was
the payment
A standard based upon the voluntariness of payment would
seem to be fair, workable, and grounded in common sense. For
example, if someone paid the IRS to avoid imprisonment or foreclosure due to a falsely assessed tax, that person should be allowed
to pay the tax to preserve their person and possessions and then be
allowed to sue the government for a refund. More difficult situations would arise in cases such as Williams, where the person paying
the tax is in a difficult situation because although they may not
actually owe the money to the government, they pay anyway to
avoid other unpleasantries, such as being sued for not conveying
clear title or closing on time.1 4 Under these circumstances, it may
be difficult to ascertain whether the person actually paid the tax
under some force of compulsion, or whether they were just looking
for an easy solution. In fact, this appeared to be a point of contention between the majority and the dissent in Williams:. whether Williams could be considered a taxpayer for practical purposes
because she was forced to pay the taxes involuntarily, or whether
Williams opted to pay the taxes of another, foregoing other possible though costly remedies. T4
An inquiry that considered all the facts and circumstances involved could have been utilized to determine whether Williams was
truly a "victim" of unfortunate circumstances who paid the tax
under compulsion, or whether she paid the tax voluntarily, either
because she was involved in some sort of scheme to shield Rabin's
assets or because she simply elected the wrong remedy.14 5 A stan-

dard that takes into account the voluntariness of the third-party
voluntarily pays the taxes for another person is not entitled to prosecute a refund
action.... However, it has been held that where a third party pays another entity's
tax on the mistaken assumption that he was personally liable, rather than payment to
remove a tax lien, and the [IRS] does not dispel his assumption, the third party may
bring a suit for refund") (footnote omitted); id. at § 58A.09 (explaining that "the
word 'taxpayer' is deemed to include the person against whom the tax was assessed as
well as any person who in fact pays the tax, if such payment was not voluntarily
made") (footnote omitted).
142 See Wil/ams, 115 S. Ct. at 1616, 1620. The Court took the voluntariness of the
payment into consideration when it determined that Williams was not a volunteer
because she paid the tax under protest. Id. at 1616. In addition, the majority expressly stated that it left undecided any circumstances under which someone who
volunteered to pay the taxes of another might be able to seek a refund. Id. at 1620.
143 See W//liams, 115 S. Ct. at 1615.
144 See generally id.
145 See id.
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claimant's payment would comport with strict statutory construction, permitting only a "taxpayer," a party that is subject to any internal revenue tax, to take advantage of the waiver of sovereign
immunity. A voluntariness standard would also be fair by virtue of
permitting refund actions by third parties who truly have no other
recourse, as well as excluding those who either slept on their rights
by failing to pursue other remedies or tried to take advantage of
the system.
Christine Vail

